Paul Voetius, Prima Philosophia Reformata, Chapter II, Section I.
The chapter has been split into two separate post's because Section II is rather long.
Author: Paul Voetius.
Translator: Claude 3 Opus.
Editor: Onku.
Manuscript: Here
Section I.
1. The definition of Metaphysics is handed down.
2. Art is not the genus of Metaphysics.
3. Neither also is it Wisdom.
4. The genus of Metaphysics is Science.
5. It is shown through what principles it demonstrates its things.
6. An objection is answered.
7. It is shown that Metaphysics is a speculative Science.
8. Objections are removed.
1. From the prolegomena of Metaphysics I will proceed to its nature, which is contained in the definition. In handing this down the opinions are dissenting, all of which to examine is not my mind. This one alone pleases me: Metaphysics is the science, which contemplates being, in as much as it is such. I do not add to the Definition, what Combachius subjoined to his: And what are in being per se. For when I say being, there also ought to be understood under being the things contained, included in being. And, when I say, being as such, I denote that in Metaphysics is explained the nature of being, as such; its species, or as it were; principles and properties.
2. But, that the nature of Metaphysics may accurately be established, I will inquire in order into its Genus & Causes. About the genus a double question arises. Whether it is Science? Whether speculative Science? To the first question I respond, first according to remotion; then according to position. And I state, that the Genus of Metaphysics is not Art, unless someone, hoping for a garrison in terms, says, that he accepts the word art for any Discipline whatsoever; or by art understands a System of Precepts useful in life. But thus he would not apply the proximate genus to the Definition; which yet is required according to the precepts of Logic. Nor would he define the thing, but the precepts comprehending the thing. But in the definitions of Disciplines regard is not to be had to the comprehension of the precepts, but to the things themselves comprehended by the precepts; unless they want to deny, that the Disciplines are to be considered by us, as habits; which is absurd. But if the word Art is strictly taken; (as it is to be taken) now it is certain, that art is not the Genus of Metaphysics, either proximate, or remote. Both, because Metaphysics produces no work, no artifice, ποίησεως, μίμησεωs excellent having not been invented. And also, because no operable object is considered in Metaphysics. For neither, when it is acted concerning being in general, concerning finite being, does man practise anything about that. Nor is such a thing producible by man, as Metaphysician, to the example of another being. Therefore.
3. Nor also will Wisdom be able to be called the Genus of Metaphysics. Both, because what is the genus ought to be by that more general, of which it is the genus. But Wisdom is not more general than Metaphysics. For since Wisdom is the habit of conclusions, produced through first principles; & that habit itself is Metaphysics: it follows, that Wisdom is neither broader, nor narrower than Metaphysics. And also, because the nature of Genus is, to be able to be predicated of more, & to be ordinable to more. But Wisdom is only unique, & cannot be multiplex. Therefore, because not multiplicable into more, it cannot put on the nature of Genus. The antecedent is proved. For since Wisdom is of first principles; & the first principles are only of one Science: (otherwise, if any other Science distinct from Metaphysics had first principles, it itself would be Metaphysics) & the first is only unique, & can be: (since a super-superlative is not given) nor can the same first principles be of diverse Sciences; (since it is necessary that the principles of any Science be proper, not common) it follows, if Wisdom considers first principles, that it can only be unique. And consequently it does not put on the nature of Genus.
4. It must therefore be said, that the Genus of Metaphysics is Science; & indeed true and properly so called. It is proved 1. Because some Science is given, which speculates Being, in as much as it is such. But that very one (as is established from what has been said before) is Metaphysics. Therefore Metaphysics is Science. 2. Because in Metaphysics are all those things, which are required for the reason of Science properly so called. Therefore it is Science. The antecedent is proved. Metaphysics has an object, in which properties are inherent, demonstrable concerning the object through principles. But, that these three be present for the reason of Science properly so called, suffices. Therefore it has all those things, which are necessarily required for Science. The individual things will be able to be deduced thus. Metaphysics is occupied with Being, which it contemplates. Therefore it has a knowable object. And that object has its affections, or attributes, namely unity, truth, goodness; and it can demonstrate those attributes through principles, and that both a priori, and a posteriori. Therefore.
5. But here it is to be examined, of what sort those Principles are. Some judge, that Metaphysics demonstrates through all genera of causes. But that absurd opinion. Both, because the Metaphysician, by abstracting from matter, cannot demonstrate through material cause properly so called. Not also through formal cause; because it abstracts from simple & composite Being. Nor is demonstration given through form, except where there is composition from matter & form. And also, because demonstration cannot be given concerning God through efficient, or end: since nevertheless the attributes of Being are demonstrable concerning God. And finally, because, if it demonstrated through efficient, demonstration would have to be instituted concerning efficient cause through another efficient: since Efficient is treated in Metaphysics, as concerning an affection. Therefore to be proved through another efficient. And that other through another; and thus a progress would be given into infinity. Which is absurd.
It must therefore be said, that Metaphysics has causes & Principles of demonstration, which are nothing other, than means, by which the properties of Being are necessarily proved concerning Being. Which therefore can be called causes & principles, of course formally in knowing. Therefore for demonstration complex principles suffice, most common axioms; likewise any reasons whatsoever, which are apprehended by us, as prior to other formal reasons.
6. But this is objected against the opinion hitherto established. How it can happen, that Metaphysics is science, & yet the name Wisdom is truly attributed to Metaphysics: since Science & Wisdom are opposite habits: and one opposite includes the negation of the other opposite? Meurisse responds: "The word Science is to be accepted otherwise and otherwise." "For either by Science we understand only the habit of conclusions: and thus it is opposed to Wisdom." "So that it cannot be called Wisdom, which is the knowledge not only of conclusions, but also of first principles." "Or by Science we understand the most noble Science, which by its scope embraces the knowledge of the highest causes." "And thus he thinks, that Metaphysics can be called at once both Science & Wisdom." But this distinction does not please me. For in the last acceptation Science cannot be called the genus of Metaphysics, since thus it is taken for Wisdom. But here it is disputed concerning Science, which is the genus of Metaphysics, or which is the genus of Wisdom; since Metaphysics is Wisdom itself. Rather therefore if I will have distinguished. Either Science is accepted for the habit of conclusions, acquired through principles not-first. Or it is accepted indistinctly for the habit of conclusions, acquired through principles, abstracting from principles, both first, & not-first. In the last signification Science will be the genus of Metaphysics: for thus it is common, both to Metaphysics, & to Physics. For the Metaphysician proves through principles; the Physicist also performs that. Therefore this is common to both. Therefore also Science, by the name of which this is performed, will be common; & consequently the genus of both. But, if you restrict Science through superadded difference, by saying, Science proves through principles, but first, you will have Metaphysics: It proves through principles not-first, you will have Science in species, contradistinct to Wisdom.
7. But it is further inquired; Whether Metaphysics is a speculative Science, or a Practical one? For the decision of which question the terms will have to be explained; then it must be responded distinctly. By speculative Discipline I understand that, which acquiesces in the bare contemplation of its object, & so speculates, lest, after it has known the object, it tend further, & study to produce it anew. Thus, in Physics, whatever is known, is known only for its own sake, not however for the sake of operation. For he, who among Physicists contemplates the Heavens, or another natural body, does not intend that, to produce another similar thing to the likeness of the known object: but a perfect contemplation of the proposed object suffices for him, & in that alone he acquiesces. But by Practical Discipline I designate that, which so knows its object, about which it is occupied, that it also, after it has known it enough, produces it. Thus Ethics is a practical Discipline: for we do not acquiesce in the cognition of the nature of Virtue: but we intend that especially, that we live according to Virtue, & to the likeness of the proposed Virtue put forth acts of Virtue.
Which explication having been premised, I state, that Metaphysics is a speculative Discipline, not a practical one. Both, because it does not have an operable object, or one producible by us: but only, as such, knowable; for neither the reason of Being, as such, nor God, nor Angels can be made from the force of Metaphysical cognition. Therefore it is not a Practical Discipline. And, because it hands down no rules, which the intellect uses for the fabrication of the object. Since nevertheless in every Discipline it is necessary to be practical, that rules, canons be given, which are the norm, either of things to be done, or of things to be made. Therefore it is not a Practical Discipline. And finally, because it stops its whole cognition in itself; that is, it acquiesces in the bare contemplation of Truth. And thus it is sought for its own sake, not for the sake of operation. But, what so behaves itself, is not practical, but speculative: since for end it has contemplation alone. The antecedent is evident. Since that Science is especially for the sake of the cognition of truth; and thus stops in itself, which considers the first causes of things, & principles, & most worthy things. For to consider those, is happiness. Which, as it is the end of this Discipline; so it is sought for its own sake.
8. Nor does it stand in the way
1. That Metaphysics commands the other Disciplines, prescribes the objects of the inferior Disciplines; which seems to be the office of practising, as they say. For I respond, that Command is twofold, either speculative, or practical. The former, not the latter, befits Metaphysics. For Metaphysics does not practically order, that this, or that, be treated by an inferior Science: (such command befits Political Discipline, which by Architectonic-Political command prescribes the limits & offices to the arts, & to the Professors of the arts) but only speculatively declares those terms, without the declaration of which a sufficient inferior Discipline cannot arrive at its scope & purpose. Furthermore. It explains the names of the objects of the inferior Sciences. It touches the question, whether they are; then it leaves the further explication to the inferior Sciences, stopping its own course. So that, where it itself ends, there the other Disciplines begin: which is, to prescribe their objects to the inferior Sciences.
Nor will it stand in the way
2. That the use of Metaphysics in learning the other Disciplines is greatest. For I respond, that these are distinct: for a Science to have use, or to be practical. No Discipline is given, but it has its use, lest it seem to have been invented in vain: yet not every Discipline, the adversaries admitting, will be to be called practical. Physics furnishes a use in Medicine not to be despised: (so that, where the Physicist ends, the Physician begins) yet no one will have inferred from this, that Physics is a practical Discipline. Thus, although the utility of Metaphysics in order to other Disciplines is greatest, yet it will be badly inferred from this. Therefore it is a practical Science.